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Summary 
This paper deals with five issues: (a) the implications of the concept of sustainable development; 
(b) current bleak prospects of international adoption of sustainable development as a guideline 
for international negotiations on production, trade, finance and environment; (c) the imminent 
threat of green protectionism as a reaction on widening international gaps in environmental 
regulation regimes; (d) a possible way-out by adoption of an international Ecocharter in which 
development priorities and ecological priorities are reconciled. Finally, (e) a particular instru-
ment that deals with an area where ecological and developmental priorities often collide, namely 
developing countries' production of primary export commodities, is treated in some more detail. 
* The author thanks Hans Linnemann for useful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Any comment will 
be welcomed. Address: Free University, Faculty of Bconomics and Econometrics, Section Agrarian and Develop-
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I. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT 
Sustainable development has become a fashionable catchword in the develop-
ment jargon in a way which has not always contributed to its clarity (cf. Lélé 
1991). One of the briefest and most unequivocal definitions of sustainable 
development is the one adopted by the Brundtland commission according to 
which it is "development that meets the needs of the present without compro-
mising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (WCED 
1987:43). 
The key element in this definition is the issue of inter-generational equity. It 
focuses on the trade-off between the needs of the current generation and those 
of future generations. The trade-off concerns two aspects. Firstly, the depletion 
of non-renewable natural resources-''' for current consumption diminishes 
opportunities for next generations. The second aspect concerns the possibility 
to shift forward (to the future) the costs associated with current consumption. 
Many kinds of pollutive behaviour reflect an attitude of 'enjoy now - pay later'. 
This is for instance the case with gradual poisoning of subsoil and ground water 
by dumping toxic chemical and nuclear waste. To stop mortgaging the future 
requires a different pattern of growth in which the costs of current consumption 
are no longer passed forward to future generations. A long-term dimension is 
introduced. In the Hterature relatively broad agreement exists that four types of 
adjustments are required for sustainable patterns of development. ' 
a) introduction of production techniques and policy instruments that reduce 
pollution output; 
b) introduction of techniques oriented at recycling of waste products and 
non-renewable resources; 
1) The division between renewable and non-renewable is somewhat elusive. Many socalled 'free gifts of nature' are 
in principle renewable, though sometimes only at a limited scale and in the long term, if enough productive and 
resource efforts are spent to their reproduction. Non-renewability therefore is not always an absolute criterion, but 
one that relates to the necessary investment of time and resources, to the current technological frontier, and to the 
scale of reproduction possibilities. By these criteria mineral deposits, fossil fuel deposits, clean oceans, tropical 
rainforest, natural wetland areas, ozone layer, biological diversity, etc. can all be considered as non-renewable 
natural assets. To some extent this is illustrated by the fact that some authors regard tropical timber and rainfor-
ests as a renewable resource (Serafy 1989:11), while others regard it as a non-renewable resource. According to 
Gillis et al. (1987:522) it is not yet certain that tropical timber can be regarded as a renewable resource, like for 
instance is true in the case of most coniferous timber varieties. This uncertainty sterns from the long growth cycle 
(40-150 years) for many popular tropical hardwood varieties, the vulnerable ecology of tropical rain forests, and 
widespread lack of success - except in case of teak - of attempts to regenerate the logged varieties. 
2) Cf. Turner (1988); UNCTAD (1990); ECE (1990); WCED (1987:49); Van den Bergh (1991:123). A diverging 
view is expressed by Ascher & Healy (1990:10) who want to include as elements: distributional equity, and partici-
pation of all sectors in society in decisionmaking. 
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c) substituting non-renewable resources by renewable resources; 
d) reduction of pollutive and natural resource-intensive consumption pat-
terns. 
It is debatable whether the third type of adjustment is sufficiënt to deal with the 
problem of depletable resources. Of course, the substitution process should be 
shaped such that the regenerative capacity of renewable resources will not be 
lost. According to traditional neoclassical analysis depletion of nonrenewable 
resources could be adequatly compensated for by investing part of the proceeds 
in (any type of) projects that generate a future income flow of comparable 
magnitude as the proceeds from foregone nonrenewables . The part of current 
proceeds that should be invested depends on the long-term rate of return 
(discount rate) of alternative investment opportunities (McKendry 1991; 
Goodland & Ledec 1987:19-46; Serafy 1989). The proper rate of exploitation of 
non-renewable resources would then be related to the availability of alternative 
investment opportunities in substitution projects. Biophysical economists, like 
for instance Georgescu-Roegen, Costanza, Daly, and Cleveland, consider this 
approach to depletion of non-renewable resources as too optimistic and partial, 
since it does not present a solution for increasing entropy levels/' 
In designing the proper instruments to attain the above mentioned four catego-
ries of adjustment it is important to know why current growth patterns diverge 
from the desired growth path. One group of causes is usually described by 
economists with the term 'market failure'. This means that individual produc-
ers, governments and consumers fail to make ecologically correct economie 
decisions because they receive wrong or insufficiënt price and market signals. 
The market, when left to itself, does not bring about the most desired and effi-
ciënt allocation of resources. For this to take place, it is necessary that prices of 
products and resources reflect preferences of current and future consumers. 
Often this condition is not met, because future consumers have no vote at all. 
Moreover, for many products (including pollutants) no market and market 
prices exist. Partly this is caused by the problem how to properly valuate envi-
1) Increasing entropy means that materials and energy in a closed system decay into ever more 'unstructured' or 
chaotic forms. The term refers to the second law of thermodynamics (Cleveland 1987; Daly 1989; Ayres & Kneese 
1989). 
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ronmental externalities. ' Finally, efficiënt market allocation also requires a 
developed system of private property relations, which is lacking in the case of 
common or public goods. 
Policy instruments based on market failure. Most instruments of environmen-
tal policy focus on environmental destruction caused by market failure, and try 
to improve the functioning of the market. In this respect reference can be made 
to the Polluter Pays Principle and the User Pays Principle. Both principles have 
to secure that current producers and final consumers pay the full cost price in 
their production and consumption activities. ' Internalization of environmental 
costs should lead consumers away from their pollutive consumption patterns, 
while producers are induced to apply material-saving and less pollutive produc-
tion methods. Market failure is also dealt with by expanding the scope of pri-
vate property relations. The latter are extended by distributing common or 
public properties, and also by creating private property of tradable pollution 
rights. 
All these instruments for remedying market failure are important and deserve 
to be strengthened. Correspondingly, national and international data garnering 
on environmental functions, pollution and natural resource depletion have to 
be strengthened. ^ However, the instruments based on market failure still fall 
short in creating a sufficiently long time horizon for decisions that affect the 
environment and the use of depletable natural resources. Future generations 
and their interests remain under-represented. Therefore, non-market instru-
ments are indispensable for attaining long-term sustainable development. Polit-
ical decisions at local, national and international level have to determine the 
1) The valuation problem has three aspects. Firstly, ecological effects have no natural unity of measure. This 
specially applies to the subjective appraisal of the natural environment. Secondly, environmental effects have the 
character of externalities as well as of public goods: they represent no private property, are not sold in markets and 
their value cannot be assessed in a direct way. The third and perhaps most important aspect is that ecological ef-
fects, due to their complexity, uncertainty, and to the far from complete knowledge about the complex ecosystems, 
can hardly be forecasted (Turner 1988). Many ecological relations have a non-linear character, which means that 
sudden vehement reactions can occur after many years of small, gradual changes in some ecological variable. 
Incomplete knowledge means that pivotal change factors may be undervalued. To avoid this, broad safety margins 
are required in ecological norms and standards. A host of literature has come into existence on environmental 
valuation questions (cf. Pearce et al. 1990; Cleveland (1987); Nash & Bowers (1988); Van den Bergh 1991; Hufsch-
mid & Hyman 1982). 
2) Cf. Qpschoor & Vos (1989); Unctad (1991); Pezzey (1988). 
3) There is an ongoing debate on how these data should be coupled to or integrated in the system of national 
account statistics, given the fact that arbitrary prices have to be used (cf. Ahmad, El Serafy & Lutz 1989). It goes 
largely unquestioned that a statistical system of physical indicators should be further developed, e.g. in the form of 
material balances in which material flows and energy fluxes are registered. 
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norms and standards which correspond to an acceptable state of the environ-
ment. These norms and standards have to account for broad safety margins due 
to uncertainty about complex, long-term environmental relationships. 
Other causes than market failure. Government intervention is also necessary 
because market failure is not the only reason for environmental degradation. 
Other reasons inelude the lack of income alternatives, short-term survival 
strategies (e.g. in the case of fuelwood gathering by the poor), local overpopu-
lation, short-term interests of pressure groups in unstable political systems, 
cultural patterns, disintegration of entitlements systems to common property, 
and finally, also ignorance and irrational behaviour. All these reasons - sepa-
rately or in combination - give rise to low priority rankings for environmental 
targets and to a short-term orientation in the exploitation of natural resources. 
Socio-ecological systems analysis can help to identify the prevailing causes of 
environmental degradation in specific situations. Such analysis will be helpful 
for policy selection, since each cause may require a different policy tooi. In 
agriculture, for instance, land reforms and appropriate long-term tenure sys-
tems often appear to be important conditions for lengthening the time horizon 
of production decisions by farmers. The likelihood of producers being inclined 
to take a long-term view will increase when ecological consciousness is raised 
by extension programmes, mass-medium campaigns and education. 
Summing up, it can be assessed that in the discussion on sustainable develop-
ment the basic principle that it should be a mode of development in which 
intergenerational equity is secured, is gaining wide acceptance. More weight 
should be given to the interests of the next generations, and appropriate in-
struments have to be designed to achieve this goal. A number of these instru-
ments and working principles have gained wide international support. But this 
is where the agreement ends in the international negotiation arena. Actual 
application of the principle of sustainable development in an international 
context is still far away. 
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II. THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION OF SUSTAIN-
ABLE DEVELOPMENT 
The disagreement starts with the definition of the needs of current and future 
generations. The Brundtland report uses a rather global concept of 'needs'. It 
may be doubted whether everything that is produced at present also reflects the 
real needs of the present generation. Furthermore, and more importantly, 
before considering a trade-off of needs between generations one cannot disre-
gard large inequities within the current generation with regard to possibilities 
to fulfill current needs// A very skewed international distribution of income 
prevents large sections of the current generation from fulfilling even their basic 
needs. So there is a problem of intra-generational equity. In this context, it 
cannot be overlooked that the current and past generations in the wealthier 
countries took a more than proportional share of the world's stock of depleta-
ble resources. And, also, these countries contributed more than proportionally 
to international pollution problems. 
Several of the adjustments which are necessary to achieve sustainable growth 
tend to be frustrated by intra-generational inequity. Due to this inequity de-
veloping countries do not have the same priority ranking as industrialized 
countries. For the former, the most important social-economic policy target is 
to raise the level of per capita income and economie growth. Pressures to curb 
consumption -other than for foreign exchange constraints and as forced savings 
for capital formation- form a non-item in developing countries. To attain this 
goal further industrialization will be necessary, as there is a well-established 
link between economie growth and industrialization (Chenery 1988; Chenery et 
al. 1986). Present levels of industrialization in many developing countries are 
still below those in developing countries, especially in the lower middle income 
countries and the low income countries (excl. China). Table 1 this is indicated 
by the share of industry in GDP and the share of manufaetures in merchandise 
exports for some country groups. Roughly 40 per cent of world population lives 
in countries where industrialization levels are below those in the developed 
market economies and upper middle-income countries. Future economie 
growth in the former countries will most probably require further industrializa-
tion. Even with current state-of-the-art technology, the concomitant contribu-
tion to worldwide pollution emissions of this process will be substantial. 
1) It must be acknowledged that the Brundtland report unambiguously states that sustainable development in-
cludes both 'reviving economie growth' and meeting basic needs in developing countries (WCED 1987:49-55). 
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Table 1 Degree of industrialization in seiected country groups 
Share of industry in GDP (%) Share of manufactures in I ! 
i 
Country groups 
i 
ï 
merchandise exports (%) Share in world 
population 
1965 1986 1965 1986 (1986) 
Developed (industrialized) 40 35 69 79 15 % 
Upper middle-income 37 40 22 57 12 % 
Lower middle-income 25 30 8 27 14 % 
Low-income a) 18 20 12 29 13 % 
India 22 29 49 62 16 % 
China 38 46 46 64 22 % 
Note: a) excluding India and China which are also classified as lou income countries. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1988. 
Export opportunities for primary commodities and manufactures - even if these 
export products contribute heavily to pollution problems and natural resource 
depletion - are vital to developing countries. For their economie growth they 
need foreign exchange with which they can import investment equipment, 
technology and intermediates. So all type of environmentally-inspired propos-
als that effect in reducing their export earnings will not be received enthusiasti-
cally. In the case of the EC proposal to ban imports of tropical timber, reac-
tions from producing countries were even hostile (Hpay 1991). 
Similar disagreement arises with regard to proposals to use alteraative, envi-
ronment-friendly methods in export production of primary commodities or 
manufactures. When those methods increase the cost price of production, this 
will reduce income for exporters in developing countries. Since the world 
market price for a given product is mostly determined by market forces which 
are beyond control of a given developing country, this price will remain inflexi-
ble as to cost increases in such a country. So each form of cost increase for 
environmental purposes diminishes their current export earnings. 
As long as a wide international income gap persists, a call for restraint with 
regard to resource use to fulfill current needs -especially when such a call sterns 
from the wealthier countries- will hardly be taken seriously in many developing 
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countries. ' A skewed historie and geographical distribution of the consump-
tion of depletable natural resources and of contributions to worldwide pollu-
tion further complicates the discussion. The polluter cannot pay and will not be 
prepared to pay since he lacks sufficiënt income alternatives. A situation of 
stalemate is imminent and worldwide application of policies derived from the 
concept of sustainable development seems far away. 
International measurement problems in relation to the environment. Strict 
adherence to the Polluter Pays Principle with regard to developing countries is 
also complicated by international environmental measurement problems. If the 
polluter is to pay the proper prices, environmental functions and natural re-
sources will have to be valuated. This is far from easy in an international con-
text. 
Subjective environmental valuation methods, like those based on the willing-
ness-to-pay and the willingness-to-be-compensated,' seem less appropriate 
with regard to intercountry and transborder environmental decisions. Even if 
"the polluter pays", the permission to dump heavily polluted chemical waste in 
a poor African country is probably more a function of income and knowledge 
than a function of 'autonomous' preferences. Using these methods assumes a 
large degree of discretionary consumer choice, which is scarcely available at the 
low absolute income levels prevailing in most developing nations. Preferences 
are influenced by income, knowledge levels and culture, not only between 
individuals, but also between nations. Subjective valuation methods are not 
appropriate in situations where large differences in income and knowledge 
about long-term effects prevail. ' For environmental valuation in an interna-
tional context it is preferable to stay as close as possible to observable commer-
1) This is illustrated most radically by a statement of Razali Ismail, Malaysian ambassador at a preparatory 
UNCED conference: "If you want this planet to survive, then we should first talk about development. Why should 
we bother about environment when we are dying from hunger anyway. [...] During 45 years we tried to talk about 
development with you. We knocked at your door again and again, but it remained closed. With seven or ten rich 
countries you ruled the world. You formed your own institutions to organise your own business in the world ac-
cording to your own interests. Now we finally got you. If you don't respond to our development demands, we don't 
talk about environment. If we must go to heil, then we will go all." The Ghanaian ambassador at the Third prepar-
atory UNCED meeting in Geneva (August 1991), Edward O.Kofour, stated: "Those here who had in mind to have 
a free ride at the back of the developing countries, will have to reconsider their positions. We do not accept that 
resources at the territory of developing countries will be considered as the so<alled common patrimony of humani-
ty. This is only a hardly concealed method of the rich countries to acquire an interest in these resources, so that 
they can prescribe us how to use our resources." (Quotations in Onze Wereld / Our world, Amsterdam, October 
1991, p.27). 
2) These contingent valuation methods are based on the use of artificial markets. Other subjective valuation 
methods use implicit markets like those exemplified by acceptable travel costs, or by valuating land and property 
(cf. Nash & Bowers 1988; Bojö et al. 1990: 76-81). 
3) Cf. Hueting (1989:34-35) who mentions also other drawbacks of subjective methods for environmental valuation. 
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cial costs in existing markets. The reference base can be a different country, 
industry or situational context. In each case conventional market prices are 
used to calculate replacement costs, prevention costs, or direct cost of lost 
production/'' Even the use of objective valuation methods does not completely 
rule out the problem of intertemporal and interspatial differences in market 
valuation. By adopting international conventions on the use of reference 
markets or by adopting international minimum standards such problems can be 
minimized. 
What basis for international environmental standards ? One approach to 
environmental valuation is based on calculating the costs of complying with 
internationally-agreed environmental norms and standards. Such a set of 
standards for environmental quality could be formulated by UNEP or other 
relevant UN bodies. Corresponding tothe necessary adjustments that have 
been distinguished in Section 1 of this paper, the standards can be formulated 
as upper limits in allowable poUution emission and/or net use of depletable 
resources for a given period. But what should be the reference unit for such 
poUution and depletion quotas? In principle the standards can be linked to 
specific production processes or to countries (areas). It will be shown that each 
approach has its pros and cons from the point of view of sustainable develop-
ment. Using the international environmental standards as a benchmark calcula-
tions on its international consequences will reveal the existence of comparative 
ecological (cost) advantages between countries. For a given production sector 
one country will have to use a larger part of gross output for offsetting negative 
ecological side-effects of this production than will be needed in another coun-
try. 
In the case that international environmental standards are linked to poUution 
quotas per countries, areas with an environmental carrying capacity that is only 
lightly strained up to then, clearly have an advantage over heavily polluted 
areas. To comply with environmental minimum standards the producers in the 
already polluted area have to invest more heavily in poUution control, while a 
similar investment in a country with low industrialization and poUution levels 
would require much lower poUution control expenditures. Environmental 
minimum standards that are linked to the carrying capacity of production areas, 
1) Cf. Ahmad (1981); Hufschmidt & Hyman (1982); Bojö et al. (1990). A major representative of this approach is 
the minimum environmental standards method formulated by Hueting (1987). It counts the costs of environmental 
preservation that would have been incurredif the same production would have been undertaken in the reference 
country (countries). This method has been used in assessing the environmental costs of export production of 
developing countries in comparison to producing these products in OECD countries, e.g. in Walter & Loudon 
(1986). 
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will therefore tend to generate international relocation of pollution-intensive 
economie activities, the so-called 'poUution haven' effect. Though there is so 
far few evidence of such 'pollution haven' relocations into developing countries, 
such investment (e.g. for non-ferrous metals, paper & pulp, bulk chernicals, 
iron production) could become more important when cost differentials become 
larger due to stern environmental regulations/>' Such a movement would tend 
to equalize the pollution burden among countries. Countries with comparative 
advantages as to ecological production costs in specific pollutive industries, 
may not be particularly charmed with relocation of such industries into their 
borders. However, if they have few other options for inflow of long-term capi-
tal, they may well accept this type of direct investment, or even be prepared to 
undertake joint ventures in this field. From the perspective of sustainable 
international development this effect is not desirable. Country-based environ-
mental should only be used as an intermediary method to 'buy time' for more 
appropriate approaches. 
The alternative to country-based environmental quotas is to fix such quotas to 
specific production processes (industries, sectors). From a strict ecological 
viewpoint this approach should be preferred. It will not induce a tendency to 
international equalization of pollution levels. Instead, it creates an incentive for 
all new investment to use ecologically sound technology, at least technology 
that complies with the process-based environmental quotas. An overall lower-
ing of pollution emission and resource depletion will be the result. It is, howev-
er, to be expected that developing countries will dispute the fairness of this 
approach with two arguments. The first argument is that OECD countries in 
their past development and industrialization process have enjoyed unlimited 
opportunities to produce and consume in the cheapest ways, without minding 
about the future effects of pollution and resource-squandering. This historical 
disregard created many current transborder pollution problems, while it also 
accounts for a part of their accumulation of economie assets. It is evident that 
OECD countries will have to pay a price to clear their historical account. The 
second argument refers to the availability of the technology that is required to 
comply with process-based environmental standards. This type of standards 
puts developing countries at a disadvantage vis-a-vis industrialized countries. In 
the latter countries it is more easy to employ the latest technologies, because 
1) For an individual country - be it developed or developing - the existence of comparative ecological production 
cost disadvantages does not necessarily mean that its governement will be prepared to adjust its production struc-
ture. Governments consider it part of a trade-off between environmental and other objectives, like protection of 
domestic employment and investment, strategies oriented at maintaining an integrated domestic industry structure, 
and short-term electionist interests of politicians. 
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the required embodied ecological innovations, expertise and infrastructure 
often are readily available. In developing countries these conditions do not 
apply generally. Domestic skill levels and technology standards must be up-
graded. Many embodied technologies (intermediates, machines) have to be 
imported, which requires additional foreign exchange sources. The adoption of 
process-based environmental quotas is only feasible if solutions are found to 
these complementary problems. 
III. AN IMMINENT TENDENCY TOWARDS ECO-PROTECTIONISM 
Let us consider the case that in the near future no international agreement is 
reached on the basic issues of sustainable development. The case is not at all 
unrealistic. It will bring us in the situation that large international disparities in 
environmental regulation regimes come into existence. Within industrialized 
countries ecological issues get more and more attention, due to an increasing 
number of facts that indicate profound environmental degradation: contamina-
tion of ground and surface waters, soil contamination with toxic waste, acidifi-
cation of rain, smog problems. On basis of these facts many governments by 
now have adopted environmental objectives as part of their policy goals, though 
often not wholeheartedly and only partially. Environmental measures are being 
developed in several policy areas, especially regarding pollution emission and 
toxic waste disposal. In some industrialized countries more integrated envi-
ronmental regulation regimes - consisting of laws, institutions, monitoring, 
public conscientisation programmes, enforcement measures - are coming into 
existence. In developing countries regulatory regimes for environmental issues 
are generally less comprehensive and elaborated. Often ecological preservation 
is a side-objective to their main policy goal of increasing income per capita and 
abolishing poverty. Even if, in nominal terms, environmental standards of LDC 
governments are as high or even higher than in many industrialized countries, 
enforcement of these standards requires a well-developed state apparatus and 
high education rates of the population, both of which conditions are often 
lacking. Consequently, up to now, environmental regulation is most developed 
in a number of OECD countries/'' 
1) Even though their per capita contribution to worldwide pollution emission and natural resource depletion is 
probably still well above the world average. 
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This disparity in environmental regulation regimes will undoubtedly induce a 
sharp increase in eco-protectionism or'green protectionism'. Three types of 
eco-protectionism can be distinguished: (A) competitive cost-oriented meas-
ures; (B) eco-political retaliation measures; and finally, (C) pseudo-environ-
mental protectionism. Each category will be treated in some more detail. 
(A) To comply with environmental regulations in OECD countries produc-
ers often have to incur additional costs for production technology and adjoining 
measures to limit poUution emission and resource depletion in the production 
phase. If all producers have to comply with the same regulations, the regulatory 
framework will not interfere with existing competitive relations. Eventually, 
consumers will pay the burden of environmental preservation. However, when 
competing imports originate from countries where less strict environmental 
regulations apply, and where consequently producers do not have to incur 
additional costs for environmental preservation, competitive relations will 
effectively change. Imports from the latter countries enjoy a competitive advan-
tage. The non-existing or less strict environmental standards for export produc-
tion allegedly create an artificial cost advantage, sometimes described as envi-
ronmental dumping/^ The tendency to use countervailing instruments like 
tariffs or non-tariff measures is imminent. The main justification for such 
methods will be that they protect domestic economie branches against foreign 
'environmental dumping'. However, such allegations cannot be substantiated as 
long as no reference can be made to a common international set of environ-
mental standards. A second justification could be that they protect domestic 
industries that are involved in a process of 'environmental conversion' to 
comply with new environmental standards. In fact this is a variant of the infant 
industry argument for protection, since an industry that adopts more environ-
mentally sound production methods is regarded as a completely new branch of 
industry. The tendency towards this type of eco-protectionism becomes more 
and more clear. The pressure is so urgent that the GATT recently has reacti-
vated a working group in this area. ' 
(B) The situation is complicated by the existence of transborder ecological 
1) Cf. Ford Runge & Nolan (1990). Even with non-existing or less strict environmental standards an exporting 
country could very well have a comparable ecological cost advantage due to its natural endowments or production 
conditions. 
2) The GATT Council created a Working Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade in 1971, but 
it was never convened. Due to increasing international debate on this issue the Council decided to revive this 
Working Group by the end of 1991. From 1992 onwards it will meet on a regular basis (Mensink 1991). 
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problems, e.g. pollutions of rivers, seas and oceans, depletion of ozone layer by 
CFC-gasses, global warming by carbondioxide emission, depletion of species, 
acidification of rain, reduction of the 'green hing' capacity of rainforests. Prob-
lems like these cannot be tackled on a national level. Consequently, they re-
quire international regulation. In the optimal case all countries would perceive 
the objective need for such regulation (and the gains from it). A positive sum 
game would then exist. Countries will then be inclined to co-operate in interna-
tional negotiations to bring about the required regulatory framework. However, 
as long as an important group of countries considers the issue as a negotiation 
game in which they may either lose or win (a zero sum game, or at least as a 
variable sum game) a co-operative behaviour in international negotiations 
cannot be expected. Non-co-operation of some countries hampers, however, 
the effectiveness of efforts in countries that do try to reduce such effects. 
In the absence of a compromise, ongoing natural resource depletion or pollu-
tion emission with considerable transborder effects will provoke retaliatory 
action. A chaotic situation of unilateral steps by some larger developed coun-
tries may arise. The tuna fish boycott measure of the US was only a first case in 
point. Other import bans by EC and OECD-countries have been proposed for 
tropical hardwood and ivory. Financial policy, trade policy, and aid policy will 
be the most important instruments with which large countries will try to get 
extra-territorial leverage. As far as trade measures are used such retaliatory 
measures form a second type of eco-protectionism. 
(C) It will be difficult to distinguish between 'real' environment-related protec-
tion and measures that are in fact mainly motivated by other motives such as 
protection of local industries, employment or export products. The case of 
pseudo-environmental protection is exemplified by the campaign of the United 
States' soya lobby against alleged health hazards of (cheaper) palm oil from 
Malaysia and the Philippines, a case in which no sound evidence for the allega-
tions could be provided. This third category of measures can be described as 
ecologically-disguised 'ordinary' protectionism. 
The discussion on trade liberalism versus eco-protectionism must be put in 
perspective somewhat. First it should be stressed that pleas for completely free 
trade are not appropriate with regard to many serious environmental problems. 
Fundamentally, such pleas are based on the view that free trade will bring 
about the optimal and efficiënt international allocation of all productive re-
sources, with gains for all. But this can only occur, if the prices of products and 
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resources reflect their current and future environmental scarcities and the 
negative environmental externalities associated with their production. Since 
this is not the case, a basic argument for a completely liberal trade is no longer 
valid. 
The opposite position is chosen by the narrow environmentalists' point of view 
that welcomes all eco-protectionist measures as favourable steps, especially 
when non-tariff trade barriers are formulated in terms of environmental or 
health requirements for certain imports. This view is short-sighted as well. 
Taking into account the many interrelations between development and ecologi-
cal pressure, such trade-reducing measures are not conducive to the advent of 
long-term solutions. They hamper income-generating activities in developing 
countries and may even lead to further environmental degradation due to 
lacking income alternatives. Developing countries have much to gain from freer 
export possibilities. 
It is not unrealistic to expect that there will be growing pressure from the side 
of larger developed countries to link fairness in trade to environmental policies. 
Increases in trade barriers or actual trade retaliatory measures will be used to 
enforce compliance with their environmental goals. Without a comprehensive 
international agreement on basic issues of sustainable international develop-
ment, it is difficult to belief that current GATT rules will prevent this scenario 
from becoming true. An additional international regulatory framework is indis-
pensable to avoid a chaotic situation of increasing eco-protectionism and uni-
lateral steps by OECD countries. 
IV. AVOIDING ECO-PROTECTIONISM BY AN INTERNATIONAL 
ECOCHARTER 
To get out of the aforementioned dead-end street a realistic international 
agenda for negotiating issues related to environment and resource use is re-
quired. It is not sufficiënt to simply adopt general ethical principles concerning 
the "Value of Nature" and "Man's responsibility towards his Natural Inheri-
tance", like was done in the Declaration on the Human Environment/'' To 
arrive at an effective international agenda compromises are required on the 
relation between development targets, environmental objectives and financial 
1) Adopted at the UN Conference in Stockholm in June 1972 (cf. Fouéré 1990). 
13 
responsibility for additional costs caused by environment-preserving measures. 
Such basic compromises can be laid down in an international charter, to which 
national environmental legislation and international environmental disputes 
could refer. Such a charter could contain the following five principles: 
1) Income levels and consumption per capita in developing countnes must 
grow, for which further industrialization is necessary. 
This target will induce a further burden for the international ecosystem, in the 
form of more pollution and in the form of more resource depletion. Neverthe-
less, it follows from the demand for intra-generational equity. It further leaves 
the question open whether this income growth is to come from new, additional 
industrialization and growth, or from international redistribution of income, 
wealth and industries. Relocation of labour-intensive industries from OECD 
countries to developing countnes couldwellbe an important instrument to 
implement this first principle. Labourintensive industries offer new income-
earning opportunities for surplus labour population. Moreover, they are rela-
tively clean from an ecological point of view. 
2) The environmental burden created by further industrialization and 
consumption growth in developing countries represents a collective inter-
national problem. International co-operation will be be intensified to allevi-
ate the concomitant environmental burden. The ecological disturbances in 
the developed countries are to be redressed by and within these countries 
themselves. Governments of developing countries avoid anyform ofunneces-
sary environmental degradation. 
Adoption of this principle is crucial to the advent of sustainable international 
development. OECD countries contributed overwhelmingly to existing interna-
tional pollution and natural resource depletion. It is their own responsibility to 
diminish these problems and bear the full costs of this operation. Moreover, 
due to their higher income levels, they will also have to bear a large part of the 
environmental burden created by Third World industrialization. Developing 
countries from their side, take the responsibility to limit these new environmen-
tal problems by avoiding policy-induced environmental externalities, by creat-
ing appropriate incentive systems, and by education and extension programmes. 
OECD countries will undertake great efforts to ensure an unrestricted interna-
tional transfer of environment-preserving and material-saving technology to 
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developing countries/'' Foreign exchange constraints and skill-building con-
straints that hinder developmg countries from getting on a ecologically clean 
growth track, must be alleviated by OECD countries. The latter point is elabo-
rated in the third principle for the Ecocharter. 
3) For on agreed set of products and production processes Third World produc-
ers will be financially compensated for adoption of technology and policies 
that inflict less damage to the local and international ecological system. 
This principle represents the 'non-polluter gets paid' principle. It has already 
been accepted in the intergovemmental Montreal Agreement on reducing 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) emissions that are harmful for the ozone layer. 
The 'non-polluter gets paid' principle is not only valid for exports of commodi-
ties and manufactured products, but also for non-traditional services. If the 
world community wishes to save certain natural biotopes, like tropical rainfor-
ests, it will have to pay the countries concerned for delivering such a service to 
the world community. / To the extent that retrenchment of natural resource use 
leads to severe reduction of Third World commodity exports, the latter coun-
tries will be monetarily compensated for lost export earnings and for the costs 
of diversifying their export base. 
Of course, implementation of the compensation principle should be shaped in 
such a form that it doesn't destroy the incentive for the country (its producers 
and government) to change their export base in an environmentally sound 
direction. 
4) Monetary compensation for foregone exports, for diversification, and for 
introduction of ecologically closer-to-optimal production techniques will be 
tied to a transition period. The length of the transition period may vary 
according to the achievement ofincome altematives, and according to policy 
consistency in the countries involved. 
Given the income inequality among countries, the transitional period could be 
fairly long for some countries, especially those with mono-export products or 
1) Technology transfer cannot not be a one-way street, however. Developing countries have adopted or preserved 
production and consumption practices which often use less depletable natural resources, create less waste, and emit 
less pollution than comparable practices in OECD countries. Even though these patterns may have been developed 
or preserved due to income constraints, many of them deserve careful reconsideration. 
2) Recently this idea has also been adopted by the GATT, in a report which states that rainforest states are now in 
fact effectively exporting, free of charge, carbon absorption services to the rest of the world (GATT 1992:28-29). 
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poor natural endowments. 
5) Allforms of eco-protection in international trade will be completely ruled out 
in the framework of'the comingMultilateral Trade Organisation (GATT). 
This fifth principle will facilitate adoption of the other five principles. It offers 
an incentive for Third World producers to enter international agreements, 
since they are most affected by current and imminent threats of environment-
related protection measures. Though issues of eco-protectionism have not been 
a hot discussion item during the 1986-1992 Uruguay Round of the GATT, they 
will very likely become so in the next round (e.g. Arden-Clarke 1991). Other 
forms of systematic trade restrictions for products from developing countries, 
and certainly when they stem from clean, labour-intensive industries, are to be 
abolished on short notice. It goes beyond saying that a trade-restricting meas-
ure like the Multi Fiber Arrangement, will be among the first victims. 
When these five principles are included in an international Ecocharter, a large 
step forward will be made in international application of the principle of sus-
tainable development. Several already existing international environmental 
facilities and organisations, like UNEP, the Global Environmental Facility, and 
the CFC-Fund of the Montreal Protocol, could all easily fit into a concerted 
implementation of this Ecocharter. 
The second and third principle are rational both from an ecological and from 
an economie point of view. The economie rationality has to do with the effi-
ciency of environmental investments. Such investments are subject to decreas-
ing returns to scale. The marginal yield of additional investments will vary per 
region. An additional dollar spent on environmental preservation will be more 
effective in terms of decreasing negative ecological externalities when it is 
spent in areas, like many LDCs and Eastern Europe, where such investments 
were scarce up to then, compared to its investment in OECD countries where 
many of such investments already took place. Given the border-crossing nature 
of many negative environmental externalities international reallocation of 
investment funds for environmental preservation will be a wise step. 
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V. INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY-RELATED ENVIRONMENTAL 
AGREEMENTS AS INSTRUMENTS FOR ATTAINING SUSTAINABLE 
PRODUCTION OF PRIMARY COMMODITIES 
The implications of the 'non-polluter gets paid' principle will now be discussed 
for primary commodity exports from developing countries to OECD countries. 
Export earnings on basis of primary commodities often are not neutral as to the 
environment. In conventional macroeconomic accounting export earnings are 
considered as a contribution to national income, regardless of their composi-
tion. Export earnings from depletable natural resources like oil, minerals, 
tropical timber, or erosion intensive agricultural products are considered as 
regular contributions to national income. From a perspective of sustainable 
development a Hicksian income concept is more appropriate. ^ Using this 
approach, exports of depletable natural resources would be considered as 
capital consumption rather than income. This is an illustration of how false 
price signals promote the incorrect idea that faster exploitation of non-renewa-
ble natural resources creates a proportionally higher rate of economie growth. 
Ample evidence exists that ecological costs of primary commodity exports are 
often substantial. ' Their repercussions are often of a transborder nature. 
Though powerful ecology movements hardly exist in most Third World 
countries, their governments have become more and more aware of the need to 
minimize damage to the environmental resource base that supports their 
commodity exports. Non-govermental organisations (often from OECD coun-
tries) also played an important role in raising international awareness on large-
scale processes of environmental degradation, e.g. in the case of tropical rain-
forests. The knowledge on these processes is available, but how can the neces-
sary adjustments be set in motion ? 
First it has to be established that earnings from primary commodity exports are 
crucial to economies of many developing countries. In the low-income coun-
tries (excl. India and China) and the lower-middle income countries primary 
commodity exports accounted for approximately 73 per cent, respectively 
61 per cent of total merchandise exports in 1989. For the twenty severely in-
debted middle income countries primary commodities represented 58 per cent 
1) According to Hicks (1946:172) income is the maximum amount that can be consumed in a given period without 
reducing the amount of possible consumption in the future. 
2) Some evidence is summarised in Ascher& Healy (1990); Barbier (1990); Hpay (1991); Kaczynski (1991); Kox 
(1991); Kox & Stellinga (1992); McKendry (1991). 
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of total rnerchandise exports (World Bank 1991: 234-235). Without these 
exports they would severely be restricted in their import capacities and debt 
servicing capacities. This sensitivity has already become manifest by the the 
very low commodity prices of the period since 1980. According to an all-item 
commodity-price index calculated by The Economist magazine, commodity 
prices in real terms have never been so low since the magazine started this time 
series in 1845. ' Many countries with strong dependence on commodity-ex-
ports (especially mono-exporters) did not react by cutting back their export 
volumes, as ordinary price theory would expect them to do. They rather in-
creased their export volumes, due to the foreign exchange earnings constraint 
to which they were subjected as a result of import requirements, debt servicing 
obligations and IMF/World Bank adjustment programmes. This type of beha-
viour of mono-exporters with a lack of short-term alternatives for foreign 
export 
pr ice 
p1 
p2 
supply curve 
J L 
export volume 
exchange earnings, can be described by a kinked supply curve like in Chart 1. 
Above a point (A) the supply increases with an increasing world market price; 
this is the orthodox case. When prices falling below pi, however, the supply 
quantity will also increase, but now with falling prices; this could be labelled 
the perverse supply case. The point (A) reflects the level at which the con-
straint of lacking foreign exchange alternatives becomes operative. ' The effect 
of this type of behaviour is a fierce competition in many already overcrowded 
commodity markets, so that a constant pressure on commodity prices exists. 
1) 'Incommodïous commodities', The Economist, January llth 1992, p. 62. 
2) Such an export reaction does not go on infinitely. When prices fall below p2, the export producers will complete-
ly turn their back to the market: mines will be closed, farmers may concentrate on domestic food crops, or change 
to subsistence agriculture. Commodity-importing countries and/or commodity traders are evidently the benefïci-
aries of this type of producer's behaviour. 
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In this situation, commodity exporting countries will not be prepared to volun-
tarily adopt measures that further diminish their foreign exchange earnings 
from primary commodities. Therefore, a demand arises for instruments that 
induce ecological readjustment in commodity production but do not lower their 
foreign currency earnings. Import bans in the OECD, like those proposed for 
tropical hardwood and ivory, clearly do not comply with this constraint. 
In most cases possibilities are available for making continued exports of the 
commodities more sustainable by using alternative production techniques, like 
integrated pest management as alternative to the use of chemical pesticides. In 
many cases alternative production methods for commodities exist with which 
production could be made more sustainable. Feasibility of alternative tech-
niques must be established on a commodity-by-commodity basis, often with 
necessary region-specific modifications. Government extension programmes 
could distribute the necessary knowledge among producers and international 
knowledge-sharing could be helpful. 
What will trigger the actual adoption of these alternative technologies ? Mas-
sive adoption of environment-preserving technologies in commodity production 
will stagger when they lower the producer's income levels. This will be the case 
when alternative technologies increase the production costs without compensa-
tion in the form of a higher commodity price. Many, though not all alternative 
production methods increase the cost price of production. A different technol-
ogy increases the costs of initial investment and operating costs, relative to 
current techniques, when additional cost elements are introduced which are not 
matched by simultaneous productivity gains and cost savings. Extra costs will 
undoubtedly result from cases where current production methods have to be 
supplemented by additional production to neutralise harmful effects, like e.g. 
sewerage systems, water cleaning, other forms of waste clearance, and sedimen-
tation techniques, reafforestation, conservation of top soil layers in the case of 
open pit mining. 
On the price side not much improvement can be expected when ecologically-
sound production methods are used. Most commodities do not easily lend 
themselves for product differentiation. Consequently no higher price will be 
fetched as a result of being sustainably produced. For many commodities some 
grades or quality categories exist. These are based on the quality of the product 
itself, not on the way it is produced. So, fetching a higher prices for sustainably 
produced commodities will only be possible in cases where the production 
method leads to tangible product qualities. Given a sufficiënt demand for this 
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type of products, existing commercial networks will in this case have no prob-
lem in paying the necessary price markup. In the case that a sustainable pro-
duction method does not produce observably-better product qualities, it would 
require a complex system of international certifieation to induce the commer-
cial channels to pay a price markup/' 
Since neither product differentiation nor an overall price increase are very 
likely under given market conditions, there is Iittle hope that an environmental 
markup can be fetched when a single country would start producing the 
commodity in a more sustainable way. So, with a given world market price, 
introduction of these methods will undoubtedly lower producers' incomes. The 
free market solution offers meagre prospects for a higher price to enable more 
sustainable forms of commodity production. Though there may be long-run 
gains for them as well, producers in developing countries will not voluntarily 
adopt these alternative production methods. Their participation could be 
improved by granting subsidies for covering additional investment require-
ments and cost increases. The scope for such subsidies is severely limited by the 
fact that many Third World governments already run serious fiscal deficits and 
are in the process of diminishing all kind of subsidy schemes due to IMF- and 
World Bank-inspired adjustment programmes. 
Within the national context, possibilities for improving the ecological produc-
tion conditions for primary commodity exports are limited, therefore. Interna-
tional market regulation forms a prerequisite for internalisation of the addi-
tional costs of producing export commodities in an environmentally closer-to-
optimal way. It is possible to create an international economie instrument to 
promote environmental production conditions in the commodity export sector 
of developing countries, which will hardly affect current export earning levels. 
Treaties regulating international trade in primary commodities do not have to 
start from scratch. A tradition exists of toughly negotiated international 
commodity agreements between consuming and producing nations. New inter-
national agreements to promote sustainable forms of commodity production 
can build upon the remnants of 'traditional' commodity agreements. But, unlike 
the latter, it is not concerned with price stabilisation. It aims primarily at inte-
gration of environmental externalities in the commodity prices paid by OECD 
countries. To stress the different function of this type of agreements, and to 
partly avoid the negative image of prior international commodity agreements, a 
1) For agrieultural products, such a certifieation initiative is promoted by the International Federation of Organic 
Agriculture Movements (IFOAM). 
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new name is supposed: International Commodity-Related Environmental 
Agreement (ICREA)/^ It entails that importing countries will have to pay the 
fuU price of sustainable production methods for these commodities. At present 
this is not the case, since international commodity markets function in such a 
way that OECD consumers gratuitously reap a part of producing countries' 
welfare. Moreover, in importing countries such unsustainable prices for im-
ported commodities continue to emit false price signals to technological and 
organisational innovation, and to consumers. The magnitude of the hidden 
environmental subsidy transferred to OECD countries by not levying the envi-
ronmental premium, is far from trivial (e.g. Walter & Loudon 1986). An inte-
gration of environmental externalities in the OECD2) import price of commod-
ities would, therefore, be justified both on ecological and on economical 
grounds. 
The relation between sustainability of production methods and the internation-
al market price is complex. A higher price for export products does in no way 
guarantee that production methods will become more sustainable. A price 
increase is a necessary, but not a sufficiënt condition to bring about environ-
mentally-sound production methods. A very complex relation exists between 
agricultural export prices and the nature of applied agricultural methods. For 
instance: If a low input type of agriculture, using few chemicals and fossil 
energy, was the result of a preceding income restraint that prevented the use of 
much external inputs, a price increase will induce a higher rate of use of exter-
nal inputs, with often polluting consequences (cf. Kox & Stellinga 1992). The 
conclusion may be that a higher price can enable more sustainable forms of 
production, but to guarantee that this actually happens, it has to be coupled 
with forms of international regulation and monitoring. 
Integration of environmental externalities in the OECD import price of 
commodities can most easily be accomplished by levying a tax on imported 
commodities in OECD countries. The tax would be collected in the form of a 
1) In earlier publications on this item also the name of International Commodity and Environment Agreement 
(IECA) or New International Commodity Agreement (NICA) have been uscd (cf. Kox 1991a, 1991b). In discussing 
the idea most references to the traditional international commodity agreements appeared to evoke unnecessary 
negative associations. To avoid such negative 'externalities' of a name it is proposed to adopt the present name of 
International Commodity-Related Environmental Agreement (ICREA). It properly puts the main accent on envi-
ronmental aspects. 
2) 'OECD countries' refers here in fact to a wider group of countries which can afford to pay the full price of their 
imports. This group probably will include some 'graduating' developing countries, lifce Singapore, Hong Kong and 
South Korea, and also the rich oil countries. 
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fixed surcharge per imported quantity. Taxes thus collected are periodically 
remitted to the Environment Fund, managed by the Secretariat of a newly 
created ICREA. Governments from producing countries can make drawings 
- proportional to their export share - from this fund. Fund allotments should 
only be granted for the purpose of financing specific projects and programmes 
which are set up to make the production of this commodity more sustainable. A 
system of periodically monitoring by the ICREA Sectretariat can ensure that 
countries used the funds for the agreed purposes. Future allotments will be 
made dependent on past performance. An International Commodity-Related 
Environmental Agreement of this type would introducé the principle of the 
non-polluter gets paid ex post. In the start-up phase it is conceivable that envi-
ronmental tax is already collected to form a Fund of some required proportions 
before the environmental preservation programmes in the export countries 
have come in full swing. / 
Before an institution of this kind is created a number of preliminary steps have 
to be taken. These preparatory steps can be ordered in two phases, a research 
phase and a negotiation phase. Both phases are further specified in an 
appendix to this paper. An important ingrediënt of the study phase concerns 
the probable reaction of all relevant economie agents, and especially the substi-
tution effects which may occur. From the point of view of consumers the price 
markup, in whichever form it is levied, functions as a turnover tax on the inter-
national price of the commodity. The likelihood of substitution by consumers 
decreases with the share of the commodity's import price in the price which the 
consumer pays for the final product. Most substitution effects may be expected 
from manufacturing agents and large importers. How price elasticity affects 
their demand for the commodity has to be estimated by considering cross elas-
ticities for viable substitutes. If large substitution effects, and consequently 
demand-shrinking, are probable, the ICREA may not be the most appropriate 
solution for internalizing environmental externalities. Unless, of course, it is 
supplemented by a compensatory scheme for foregone export earnings of the 
commodity involved. 
The negotiation process draws heavily on a well-understood long-term self 
interest of nations. The most important divergences of opinion will probably 
spring from other short-term interests and regional or country-group egoism. 
1) Also existing facilities like the Common Fund for Commodities or the Global Environmental Facility could 
contribute or guarantee a start capital for the ICREA Fund. 
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An essential negotiation element wili be how to cope with free riders. If coun-
tnes systematically share the benefits of an ICREA without carrying part of its 
burden, this forais a time bomb under the agreement. Free-ridership can occur 
both between countries and within countries. Handling this problem will be a 
important determinant in the choice of the eventual institutional form of the 
ICREA. 
23 
VI. Conclusion 
The environmental implications of the principle of sustainable development 
become increasingly clear, but adoption of this principle as a guideline for 
international negotiations seems still far away. The problems are associated 
with the very hart of the concept of sustainable development, that is its defini-
tion of needs. In a situation where large international income disparities con-
tinue to exist, considerable effort will have to be spent on overcoming this 
barrier to sustainable international development. 
The UNCED conference in June 1992, even if it will look like a Babylonian 
confusion of tongues, is a first and necessary step to attain this goal. Broad 
ratification of the pre-cooked Climate Treaty is in itself an important achieve-
ment. Adoption of an international Ecocharter (or Earth Charter) that incor-
porates the aforementioned principles would, like the Human Rights Charter, 
form an expression of principles of civilization. Therefore it will have to 
acknowledge the economie preconditions for sustainable development. It also 
has to acknowledge the responsibility of the richest countries for temporarily 
offsetting the additional costs that LDCs have to incur for reaching sustainable 
patterns of development. Without these elements the Earth Charter will be 
worth only the paper on which it is written. The preparatory UNCED-meetings 
have clearly shown that many developing countries will not even consider to 
give up opportunities for income growth, let alone national sovereignty. In their 
opinion the Northern countries try to solve self-created environmental prob-
lems at the cost of Southern countries. Due to the overwhelming historical 
share of Northern countries in international pollution and resource depletion 
this standpoint is not completely mistaken. But it is simplistic, as shown by the 
seriousness of many transborder problems. For instance that Southern Chile, 
though itself being one of the cleanest regions on earth, is located under a hole 
in the ozone layer. A report in the Financial Times of November 1991^ men-
tioned a considerable increase in various negative biological effects of sharply 
increased ultraviolet-B radiation on man, animals and plants. Maybe such 
effects are still not alarming enough, and effective action may be delayed until 
holes in the ozone layer are situated above large urban areas in major OECD 
countries as well. But at some point in time it will become clear that border-
crossing ecological problems make it unavoidable to create international insti-
tutions and instruments for attaining sustainable patterns of development. 
1) L.Crawford, Rabbits blinded by ozone hole, Financial Times November 6th 1991. 
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ANNEX 
PRELIMINARY STEPS FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY-RELATED 
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS (ICREAs)^ 
During the research phase rather detailed technical and economie studies are required relating 
to ecology, production and functioning of markets for a specific commodity. Five sub-themes can 
be specified. For the four first sub-themes it may be necessary to differentiate between the main 
producing countries. 
a) Inventarisation and quantification of ecological effects of its export production. Effects will 
be formulated in terms of several relevant indicators and measures (continuous or dis-
crete) that are relevant for this commodity. 
b) Assessment of relevant alternative production techniques and additional measures that 
would limit the most important negative environmental effects, with an indication (on 
purely technical criteria) of a time path for implementation. 
c) Appraisal of economie effects of alternative production techniques and additional meas-
ures, with regard to production costs and production volumes. This has to include a tenta-
tive assessment of effects on import requirements, employment and production regions. 
For the best alternative techniques the incremental cost price relative to costs under 
current techniques has to be established, thus indicating the magnitude of the gross price 
markup that will be necessary. Incremental cost effects in some important export countries 
must be estimated. 
d) Investigation of probable substitution effects that may occur in consuming countries and 
industries as a consequences of the estimated gross price markup. 
e) Assessment of the optimal form in which the environmental premium is to be institutiona-
lized, and formulation of proposals for procedures, checks, monitoring agencies, and fund 
management. 
On basis of reports on ecological effects (a), technical-economic studies (b,c) and expected 
market reactions (d) proposals have to be put forward with regard to implementation priorities 
of alternative techniques and the associated level of the environmental premium. In the fifth sub-
study it should be considered if and how international orgariisations, such as the Common Fund 
for Commodities, Unctad's IPC programme and UNEP, could facilitate introduction of an Inter-
national Commodity-Related Environmental Agreement. 
The negotiation phase builds upon the results and proposals of the first phase. Most probably, the 
studies will contain a number of variants rather than clear-cut, unambiguous conclusions on the 
issues involved. Across various diverging interests - between producing and consuming nations, 
1) This annex draws heavily upon previously published articles (Kox 1991a, 1992b). The feasibility of ICREAs and 
their optimal structure form the object of a larger research project at the Faculty of Economics and Econometrics 
of the Free University (Amsterdam). 
28 
between producing countries with different production conditions, between ecological action 
groups, governments, and established interests in commodity chains (like transnational compa-
nies) - agreement has to be reached on a number of issues. The most important of them are: 
* Decision criterion for determining the magnitude of the environmental premium. If a 
generic premium level is preferred, it has to be decided which reference countries will be 
used for determining the increase in average units costs due to alternative techniques. For 
instance, it should be considered whether the premium level should be such that marginal 
producers are kept in the market, or that 'average' producers are taken as benchmark. 
* Levels of unacceptable ecological damage. Which types and levels (for all relevant criteria) 
of negative environmental externalities should be abated ? Discussion can be expected on 
policy-induced versus 'average technology'-induced ecological damage. If a generic premi-
um level is used, it will not be necessary to cover the costs of a complete ecological 'over-
haul' of production methods in all export countries. In some countries it will require addi-
tional financial efforts - of the national government or by country-specific environmental 
aid programmes - to cover the surplus costs above the threshold level which is financed by 
the ICREA funds. 
* Magnitude of the environmental premium. Having established the reference countries, the 
ecological effects that have to be neutralised, the incremental costs (given known technol-
ogies), it is possible to fix the level of the environmental premium. Some other considera-
tions may enter the discussion, however. For producing nations a trade-off exists between 
ecological damage and the potential loss of export earnings which is likely given a certain 
price elasticity of commodity demand. Their attitude depends among other things on the 
availability export diversification alternatives. For consuming nations a trade-off exists 
between current cheap commodity supply versus tolerating further ecological damage in 
producing countries that bolsters future threats to the global ecosystem. 
* Finally, governments must achieve an agreement on a number of questions relating to the 
institutional form in which the price markup will be introduced. Associated with this 
conclusion are decisions on monitoring system, government representation, and sanction 
procedures to guarantee that the price premium will be paid and that resulting extra 
earnings will be allocated to expenses for environmental reconstruction and conservation 
as agreed upon in the agreement. Finally, some dynamic procedures regarding the level of 
the environmental premium over time must be endorsed. 
The environmental premium can be levied in several forms, each having its own advantages and 
disadvantages. The most obvious way seems to charge the levy the moment at which the com-
modities pass a border. This may be the border of the exporting country or that of the (ultimate) 
importing country. In the first case it has the form of an export tax, in the latter case it is an 
import duty. On several grounds export taxes are less appropriate. None of these problems arise 
with the import levy variant (cf. Kox 1991a). Charging the environmental premium at the border 
of importing countries makes it possible to charge only OECD countries, and perhaps some 
NICs and OPEC countries. The import surcharge should be commodity-specific and will have to 
be paid by importers in commodity-importing developed countries. They pay a fixed amount per 
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quantity imported to the fiscal authorities of their national government. ' By levying it on a 
generic basis on all imported quantities, the need to check for origins (due to re-export) is elimi-
nated. It also thwarts the incentive for free-ridership on the side of exporting countries. 
Governments of importing countries periodically transfer the revenues from the surcharge to a 
special Environment Fund, administered by the ICREA board. ' Free riding by importing coun-
tries will be difficult. Governments of producing countries can make drawings from the ICREA 
environment fund, with maximal drawing rights proportional to their export volume. Definitive 
remittance of allotted funds is dependent upon the content and soundness of the proposals put 
forward by governments. The financing proposals formulated by governments (perhaps on behalf 
of exporting companies in their country) concern specific projects for additional investments in 
ecology-friendly production methods, subsidy programmes for use of alternative production 
methods or inputs, ' and local environmental preservation projects in commodity-producing 
areas. The ICREA could offer technical, organisational and economie assistance to governments 
to help them formulating feasible proposals for funding. Evaluation of project proposals by the 
ICREA could be based on expected ecological effect, technical and organisational feasibility, 
effectiveness of earlier fund disbursements to the country. The chart on next page pictures how 
the organizational structure of an ICREA could look like. 
1) Customs clearance in the port of entry should be the determining criterion. It avoids troubles with differences 
between physical and non-physical (futures) trade. 
2) Exporting countries and a statistical department of the ICREA secretariat together assess annual total export 
volume and its country destinations. On basis of this, with a correction for re-exports, the gross payable amount for 
each importing country is easily assessed. 
3) In case of commodities where production is dominated by small-scale producers, governments need programmes 
that offer subsidies for implementation for specific production methods and inputs. In the implementation of such 
programmes extension services or local authorities can play a role. To the extent that production methods and or 
input use during production can be diagnosed in the product itself (e.g. chemical residues) commercial channels in 
the country (purchasing companies, exporters) can play a useful role in distributing the premium to producers that 
apply the beneficial production techniques. The ecological properties of the product, possibly in the form of a hall-
mark, become a regular quality attribute along with other quality characteristics. 
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